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ABSTRACT
A fundamental primitive in distributed computing is Reli-
able Message Transmission (RMT), which refers to the task
of correctly sending a message from a party (or player) to
another, in a network where some intermediate relays might
be controlled by an adversary. We address the problem un-
der the realistic assumption that the topological knowledge
of players is restricted to a certain subgraph and specifically
study the role of local information exchange in the feasibil-
ity of RMT. We employ the General Adversary model of
Hirt and Maurer and the recently introduced Partial Knowl-
edge Model which subsume all known models for the adver-
sary and local knowledge respectively. Tight feasibility con-
ditions, naturally involving the network topology, the adver-
sary and the local knowledge of players, are presented.
1. INTRODUCTION
Ensuring seamless communication between two indirectly
connected entities of a network is fundamental for achiev-
ing more complex cooperative tasks. Since vulnerability of
modern networks is increased along with their size, there is a
strong interest in achieving consistent communication in un-
reliable environments. This task is captured by the Reliable
Message Transmission problem (RMT), in which the goal is
the correct delivery of message xS from a sender S to a re-
ceiver R even if some of the intermediate nodes-players are
corrupted and do not relay the message as agreed. In this
work, we study RMT in the presence of a Byzantine adver-
sary which can make some players deviate from the protocol
arbitrarily, by blocking, rerouting, or even altering a mes-
sage that they should normally relay intact to specific nodes.
The feasibility of RMT naturally depends on the structure
of the network and the corruption capability of the adver-
sary. Thus, the literature has been focused on the deduction
of topological conditions which involve the adversary model
and prove necessary or sufficient for RMT to be achieved.
We stress that another important parameter affecting dis-
tributed tasks in contemporary networks is the level of play-
ers’ knowledge over the topology and the adversary. To this
end, we employ the recently introduced Partial Knowledge
Model [6], which assumes that each player only has knowl-
edge over some arbitrary subgraph of the network. It encom-
passes all previous topology knowledge models including the
extensively studied full knowledge [1, 5] and ad hoc [8, 10]
∗The present article includes results from [6, 7], which ap-
peared in the Distributed Computing journal and FCT 2017
respectively.
models (in the latter, a node is only aware of its immediate
neighborhood). The motivation for partial knowledge con-
siderations comes from large scale networks, where global
estimation of system properties may be hard to obtain, and
social networks, where proximity is often correlated with an
increased amount of available information. In this context,
we specifically study the role of local information exchange
in the feasibility of RMT. Regarding the adversary model we
address the problem under the General Adversary model [3]
which subsumes all known models such as global [2] or lo-
cal [4, 9] threshold adversaries and intuitively captures coali-
tions of adversarial players. The combination of these two
quite general models forms the most general setting encoun-
tered within the synchronous deterministic model.
We assume a synchronous network represented by a graph
G = (V,E) consisting of the player set V (also denoted as
V (G)) and edge set E which represents undirected authen-
ticated channels between players. The neighborhood of a
node v will be denoted as N (v). We will denote the sender
and the receiver nodes as S,R ∈ V respectively and say that
a distributed protocol achieves RMT if by the end of the
protocol the receiver R has decided on xS, i.e. if it has been
able to output the value xS originally sent by the sender.
The Adversary Model [3]. In the General Adversary
model, the possible corruption sets are defined by the ad-
versary structure Z, which is, a monotone family of subsets
of V , i.e. Z ⊆ 2V , where all subsets of a set Z are in Z if
Z ∈ Z. In this work we obtain our results with respect to a
General Byzantine adversary.
The Partial Knowledge Model [6]. Each player v
only has knowledge of the topology of a certain subgraph
Gv of G which includes v. Namely considering the family
G of subgraphs of G we use the view function γ : V → G,
where γ(v) represents the subgraph of G over which player
v has knowledge of the topology. We extend the domain of
γ by allowing a set S ⊆ V (G) as an argument. The value
γ(S) will correspond to the joint view of nodes in S. More
specifically, if γ(v) = Gv = (Vv, Ev) then γ(S) = GS =
(
⋃
v∈S Vv,
⋃
v∈S Ev). The extensively studied ad hoc model
(cf. [8]) can be seen as a special case of the Partial Knowledge
Model, where ∀v ∈ V, γ(v) = N (v).
To combine these two models, we first define the restric-
tion of a structure Z to a node set A as ZA = {Z ∩A | Z ∈
Z}. We assume that given the actual adversary structure Z
each player v is aware of its local adversary structure Zv =
ZV (γ(v)). We denote an instance of the problem by the tu-
ple I = (G,Z, γ, S, R), whereas in the ad hoc case we will
omit γ since it’s fixed. We will say that an RMT protocol
is safe if it never causes the receiver R to decide on an in-
correct value in any instance. The importance of the safety
property is pointed out in [8], where it is regarded as a ba-
sic requirement of a Broadcast algorithm.
2. RMT IN THE AD HOC MODEL
In this section we present a tight condition for RMT in
the ad hoc model. The proofs are variations of the respec-
tive theorems in [6] for the Broadcast problem. The follow-
ing notion proves crucial for the exact characterization of in-
stances where RMT is possible.
(Z-partial pair cut) Let C be a cut of G partitioning V \C
into sets A,B 6= ∅ s.t. S ∈ A and R ∈ B. C is a Z-pp cut
if there exists a partition C = C1 ∪ C2 with C1 ∈ Z and
∀u ∈ B, N (u) ∩ C2 ∈ Zu.
Observe that Z-pp cut, constitutes a one-sided variation
of the well known Q(2) separator notion used in [5] in the
context of full topology knowledge networks. Its existence in
a network yields impossibility of safe RMT as shown below.
Theorem 1 (RMT Impossibility). Given an RMT in-
stance (G,Z, S,R), if an RMT Z-pp cut exists on G then
no safe RMT algorithm exists for (G,Z, S,R).
Checking the above condition has been proven in [6] to be
NP-hard but interestingly, the impossibility is matched by a
variation of the simple Broadcast algorithm Z-CPA (Certi-
fied Propagation Algorithm). The algorithm was introduced
in the same work and in turn, can be seen as a generaliza-
tion of CPA Broadcast algorithm, proposed in [4]. In Z-
CPA, initially, the sender sends its value xS to all its neigh-
bors and terminates. Subsequently, each player v decides on
a value through a decision rule and propagates its decision
to all its neighbors if v 6= R, or outputs its decision if v = R.
The core of Z-CPA consists of the following decision rules:
Z-CPA decision rules: If v ∈ N (S) then upon reception
of xS from the sender, decide on xS. Else, if v /∈ N (S) then
upon receiving the same value x from all neighbors in a set
N ⊆ N (v) such that N /∈ Zv, decide on value x.
Z-CPA proves to be tight for RMT by a variation of the
theorem presented in [6] as shown below. This practically
means that given an ad hoc RMT instance I, the best one
can do is to execute Z-CPA; if RMT is not achieved then
no safe algorithm can achieve RMT in I.
Theorem 2 (Feasibility of RMT). Given an RMT
instance (G,Z, S,R), if no RMT Z-pp cut exists on G, then
Z-CPA achieves RMT in (G,Z, S,R).
The minimal communication that Z-CPA utilizes is note-
worthy. For instance, Theorems 1,2 imply that in the ad
hoc model, local knowledge exchange between players can-
not benefit the feasibility of the problem. Considering par-
tial knowledge in its most general form, presents a new chal-
lenge in the study; namely, it becomes clear that tight re-
sults can be obtained only if the players exchange and ap-
propriately combine their knowledge regarding the topology
and the adversary.
3. JOINING PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE
Combining topological knowledge exchanged by two play-
ers v, w is trivial, since their joint knowledge γ(v, w) can eas-
ily be computed. However, their joint knowledge over the
adversary structure is not obvious to define. In this section
we address the issue and define a joint operation over local
adversary structures1. As is proved in the following, this op-
eration allows the combination of local knowledge in an opti-
mal way. Details of this section’s results can be found in [7].
(Joint operation ⊕) Let TA = 22
A
denote the space of
adversary structures on a set of nodes A. For any node sets
A,B and adversary structures E ,F , the operation ⊕ : TA ×
T
B → T(A∪B), is defined as follows:
EA⊕FB = {Z1∪Z2|(Z1 ∈ E
A)∧(Z2 ∈ F
B)∧(Z1∩B = Z2∩A)}
Informally, the EA⊕FB operation unites possible corrup-
tion sets from EA and FB that ‘agree’ on A∩B. The ⊕ op-
eration is commutative, associative and idempotent, which
means that it imposes a semi-lattice structure on the space of
all possible partial adversary information. The semi-lattice
structure allows for the definition of a partial order relation
< on this space which guarantees the existence of a supre-
mum for every finite subset under <. Utilizing the latter, we
can prove the following property of the ⊕ operation which
is important for our study.
Theorem 3. For any adversary structure Z and node
sets A,B: Z(A∪B) ⊆ ZA ⊕ ZB.
What Theorem 3 shows is that the ⊕ operation gives the
maximal (w.r.t inclusion) possible adversary structure that
is indistinguishable by two agents that know ZA and ZB
respectively, i.e., it coincides with their knowledge of the
adversary structures on sets A and B respectively. We can
now define the combined knowledge of a set of nodes B about
the adversary structure Z given a view function γ:
ZB =
⊕
v∈B
ZV (γ(v))
Note that ZB exactly captures the maximal adversary
structure possible, restricted in γ(B), conforming to the ini-
tial knowledge of players in B. Also notice that using Theo-
rem 3 we get ZV (γ(B)) ⊆ ZB . This means that, what nodes
in B conceive as the worst case adversary structure indis-
tinguishable to them, always contains the actual adversary
structure in their scenario.
Impossibility of RMT in this case is based on the following
separator notion which is analogous to that of Z-pp cut but
also involves the joint knowledge of players.
(RMT-cut) Let (G,Z, γ, S,R) be an RMT instance and
C = C1 ∪ C2 be a cut in G, partitioning V \ C in two sets
A,B 6= ∅ where S ∈ A and R ∈ B. Then C is a RMT-cut
iff C1 ∈ Z and C2 ∩ V (γ(B)) ∈ ZB .
Then the impossibility result can be stated as follows.
Theorem 4 (Necessity). Let (G,Z, γ,D, R) be an RMT
instance. If there exists a RMT-cut in G then no safe and
resilient RMT algorithm exists for (G,Z, γ,D, R).
Conclusions. As in the ad hoc case, algorithm RMT-PKA
proposed in [7], is proven tight. This proves the optimality
of the local information exchange procedure. On the nega-
tive, RMT-PKA is of exponential bit complexity and the re-
duction of the communication cost is an open problem. Also
an interesting research direction would be to study the exact
threshold which renders local information exchange useful.
1The operation takes into account potentially different ad-
versarial structures, so that it is well defined even if a cor-
rupted player provides a different structure than the real one
to some honest player.
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